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Abstract
Background: Several highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) outbreaks have been reported over the past decade.
South Korea recently faced AI outbreaks whose economic impact was estimated to be 6.3 billion dollars, equivalent
to nearly 50% of the profit generated by the poultry-related industries in 2008. In addition, AI is threatening to
cause a human pandemic of potentially devastating proportions. Several studies show that a stochastic simulation
model can be used to plan an efficient containment strategy on an emerging influenza. Efficient control of AI
outbreaks based on such simulation studies could be an important strategy in minimizing its adverse economic
and public health impacts.
Methods: We constructed a spatio-temporal multi-agent model of chickens and ducks in poultry farms in South
Korea. The spatial domain, comprised of 76 (37.5 km × 37.5 km) unit squares, approximated the size and scale of
South Korea. In this spatial domain, we introduced 3,039 poultry flocks (corresponding to 2,231 flocks of chickens
and 808 flocks of ducks) whose spatial distribution was proportional to the number of birds in each province. The
model parameterizes the properties and dynamic behaviors of birds in poultry farms and quarantine plans and
included infection probability, incubation period, interactions among birds, and quarantine region.
Results: We conducted sensitivity analysis for the different parameters in the model. Our study shows that the
quarantine plan with well-chosen values of parameters is critical for minimize loss of poultry flocks in an AI
outbreak. Specifically, the aggressive culling plan of infected poultry farms over 18.75 km radius range is unlikely to
be effective, resulting in higher fractions of unnecessarily culled poultry flocks and the weak culling plan is also
unlikely to be effective, resulting in higher fractions of infected poultry flocks.
Conclusions: Our results show that a prepared response with targeted quarantine protocols would have a high
probability of containing the disease. The containment plan with an aggressive culling plan is not necessarily
efficient, causing a higher fraction of unnecessarily culled poultry farms. Instead, it is necessary to balance culling
with other important factors involved in AI spreading. Better estimations for the containment of AI spreading with
this model offer the potential to reduce the loss of poultry and minimize economic impact on the poultry industry.
Background
Several highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) outbreaks
have been reported over the past decade. According to a
report of the World Health Organization (WHO) issued
in December 2005, the threat of an influenza pandemic
occurring in the near future has been exacerbated with
the recent appearance and widespread distribution of
the avian influenza virus H5N1 [1]. In July 2009, the
Ministry of Health of Egypt reported three newly
confirmed human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1)
[2]. Of the 81 cases confirmed in Egypt to date, 27 have
been fatal. The report warned that the next pandemic
could result in the deaths of at least 2 to 7 million peo-
ple, with tens of millions requiring medical attention, in
the best-case scenario.
Avian influenza A (subtype H5N1) has already caused
widespread outbreaks among poultry in Southeast Asia,
with sporadic transmission from birds to humans (5)
and limited probable human-to-human transmission
[3-6]. South Korea recently faced H5N1 outbreaks
whose economic impact was estimated to be 6.3 billion
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poultry-related industries in 2008.
AI causes a contagious infection in domesticated birds
including chickens, ducks, and turkeys. The infections
take two main forms that are distinguished by low and
high virulence. The “low pathogenic” form may go
undetected because it causes mild symptoms, e.g.,
ruffled feathers and a drop in egg production. The
highly pathogenic form spreads more rapidly with a dis-
ease course that affects multiple internal organs; its
mortality rate can reach 90-100% within 48 hours [7-9].
The virus is excreted in the feces and secretions from
the nose, mouth and eyes of infected birds. Contact
with infected fecal material is the most common means
of bird-to-bird transmission but AI can also spread by
direct contact between healthy and infected birds and
via airborne secretions.
Although the risk of AI of humans is low, confirmed
cases of human infection from several subtypes of AI
infection have been reported since 1997 in Asia and
parts of Europe, the Near East and Africa [10,11]. The
human cases have occurred predominantly in previously
healthy children and young adults with direct or close
contact with H5N1-infected poultry. Bird flu has killed
more than 150 people worldwide since late 2003 and
the human mortality has been approximately 50%.
There is little immune protection against AI in the
human population because the virus generally does not
infect humans. Furthermore, because influenza viruses
have the ability to change, there is a looming possibility
that AI could gain the capacity for more efficient
human-to-human transmission [12-14]. A worldwide
influenza pandemic in humans could occur under these
circumstances. In June 2009, the World Health Organi-
zation declared a worldwide pandemic of influenza that
was caused by a “swine flu” H1N1 virus, containing
genetic elements from human, pig and bird influenza
viruses [15].
Efficient control of potential influenza pandemics
could be an important strategy in minimizing its adverse
economic and public health impacts [16]. Mathematical
models can be useful for identifying critical parameters
for public health intervention strategies in pandemics
and to elucidate the underlying complexity and non-
linear relationships [17-19]. Simulation studies have
been used to predict tempor a la n ds p a t i a le p i d e m i c
spreading patterns [14,20-26]. A contact pattern model
of smallpox spread found that outbreaks could be con-
tained by targeted vaccination combined with early
detection without resorting to mass vaccination [3]. A
stochastic epidemic model has been used to evaluate the
effectiveness of targeted antiviral prophylaxis, quaran-
tine, and pre-vaccination in containing an emerging
i n f l u e n z as t r a i n[ 4 ] .I na d d i t i o nt oa v i a ni n f l u e n z a
(H5N1), influenza A (H1N1) virus has spread rapidly
across the world [27,28]. Several reports have analyzed
virus spreading patterns and effective vaccination strate-
gies for maximizing the H1N1 containment [15,29].
Efficient control of AI outbreaks could be an impor-
tant strategy in minimizing its adverse economic and
public health impacts. This paper focuses on the results
of numerical experiments with a stochastic multi-agent
dynamics model with data obtained from an AI out-
break in South Korea in April 2008. This work is orga-
nized as follows. In the following model section, we
describe the spatial distribution of chicken and duck
flocks in poultry farms in South Korea and provide an
overview of the trajectory of the 2008 South Korean AI
outbreak. We also describe the stochastic dynamics
model and discuss the methodology of our numerical
experiments. We present the results of this study in five
sub-sections that analyze the critical properties asso-
ciated with AI outbreak spreading.
Methods
Distribution of Poultry and Poultry Farming in South
Korea
We obtained relevant data sets by requesting informa-
tion from several South Korean organizations including
the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-
eries, Korea Duck Association and the Korea Poultry
Association [30].
Poultry farming is an important component of the agri-
cultural economy of South Korea with an economic value
estimated at nearly $600 million. More than 98 percent
of chicken poultry farms and 93 percent of duck poultry
farms are of small (< 2,000 chickens or < 500 ducks) or
medium (2000-9999 chickens or 500-1,999 ducks) sized.
However, the large commercial-scale facilities (≥ 10,000
chickens or ≥ 2000 ducks) account for more than 93 per-
cent of the total number of chickens and more than 97
percent of the total number of ducks.
The statistics of chicken and duck poultry from large
sized farms in South Korea between 2001 and 2005 are
summarized in Figure 1A. During this period, there
were an average of 2,231 and 808 large sized chicken
and duck farms and the average number of chickens
and ducks housed were 92,640,000 and 10,129,000,
respectively. Figure 1B summarizes the spatial distribu-
tion of the farms by province.
There have been several AI epidemics in South Korea.
The 30% decrease in the number of poultry farms in
2003 compared to 2002 (Figure 1A) is attributable to
the AI outbreaks in 2003. The time course and the pro-
vinces affected by the 2003 and 2005 epidemics are
summarized in Figure 1C and 1D.
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Page 2 of 13Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the 2008 South Korean AI
Epidemic
The time course and spatial distribution of the 2008
outbreak are summarized in Figures 2A and 2B. Most of
the AI outbreaks in 2008 occurred in Junbook province.
The first AI outbreak occurred in Junbook province and
it has most number of poultry and poultry farms.
According to official reports, there were 43 AI outbreaks
in 2008 following the initial outbreak, which was
reported in Junbook province on April 1 2008. The sec-
ond and third outbreaks occurred near the location of
the first outbreak and were reported April 3 and 6,
2008, respectively. Four days after the first outbreak,
Junbook province officials confirmed that the highly
infectious H5N1 type of AI was responsible for the out-
break. There were 5 sequential outbreaks in Junbook
province during the first week.
The problem became more critical on April 9, 2008
when an AI outbreak was reported in the Junnam pro-
vince, and then in the Junbook province to its south. Sub-
sequently, there were outbreaks in several other provinces
including Chungnam, Gyungbuk and Gyungnam. AI
spread to Gyunggi about a month after the first outbreak
and eventually, by Day 44, most of the provinces in South
Korea had reported outbreaks of the H5N1 infection.
South Korean authorities followed the AI containment
recommendations of the World Health Organization
(WHO) [11]. A special AI task force was convened. A
containment area with a range of 3 km and a surveil-
l a n c ea r e aw i t har a n g eo f1 0K mf r o mt h ea r e ao fA I
outbreaks were declared. All vehicles for transportation
of chickens and ducks were sterilized. Sample chickens
and ducks were obtained from poultry farms in the
range of surveillance area and when AI infected samples
as were found all chickens and ducks in those poultry
farms were culled. All chickens and ducks in the range
of surveillance area were restricted from being traded
the public poultry markets.
Modeling
We constructed a spatially explicit simulation of 103
million chickens and ducks in 3,039 poultry farms in
Figure 1 A, Large size chicken (yellow bars) and duck (green bars) farms and their respective populations of chickens (red circles) and
ducks (red square) in South Korea by year are shown. B, Spatial distribution of chicken (yellow bars) and duck (green bars) farms in South
Korea by province are shown. C, The number of AI outbreaks in the poultry farms in South Korea 2003 (blue bars) and 2005 (gray bars) are
shown after the first outbreak. Bars represent the number of outbreaks during the specified period. The line represents the cumulative number
of AI outbreaks in poultry farms in South Korea 2003 (blue circle) and 2005 (blue square). D, The number of outbreaks on poultry farms is shown
by the provinces in South Korea 2003 (blue bars) and 2005 (gray bars). There is no AI outbreak in GW and JJ province due to geographical
reasons. Specifically, GW province is the province farthest away from the first AI outbreak and JJ province is an island of South Korea, which can
hardly or cannot be directly reached by truck transportation.
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tions among flocks of chicken and duck poultry, as
these are known to be the primary contexts of influenza
transmission and control measures can readily target
locations such as farms and markets where large num-
bers of poultry are present. Random contacts among
flocks of poultry birds from different farms are typically
associated with day-to-day relocation by trading in pub-
lic markets. The model does not consider the heteroge-
neity of poultry populations because poultry population
data by poultry farm are lacking.
Table 1 shows the abbreviations of each South Korean
province and the number of square units occupied by
each province. The number of chicken and duck poultry
flocks in each province was based on the average the
number of poultry and poultry farms reported in the
census from 2001 through 2005 since data for 2006 and
2008 were not available to us. Data from eight provinces
in South Korea were used in our simulations. We set up
the population of poultry flocks in our model by region
using 76 (37.5 km × 37.5 km) unit squares (Figure 3A)
to form a spatial grid approximating the map of the
Figure 2 A, The number of AI outbreaks in the poultry farms is shown after the first outbreak in South Korea 2008.Y e l l o wb a r s
represent the number of outbreaks by chickens and Green bars represent the number of outbreaks by ducks. The line represents the cumulative
number of AI outbreaks in poultry farms based on the outbreak reports by Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in South Korea
2008 in which the authorities instituted a quarantine in the area. B, The number of outbreaks on poultry farms is shown by the provinces in
South Korea 2008. Green, yellow and gray bars represent the number of AI outbreaks of chicken, duck, and chicken-duck poultry farms.
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senting 2,231 flocks of chickens and 808 flocks of ducks
in this space. The groups of poultry flocks were ran-
domly distributed within each province. We measured
the transitions of the poultry population states by ana-
lyzing the interaction among poultry flocks for 50 time
steps (1 time step = 1 day).
Figure 3B gives a schematic of the model used in our
studies. The model parameters are succinctly summar-
ized in Table 2. The parameters of our multi-agent
model are relatively straightforward to interpret in the
context of AI. The infection probability, τ, is a key factor
that was used to model the spreading of the disease. A
higher value of τ implies faster and easier transmission of
AI among poultry. The value of τ was estimated based on
the data available. Simulations were also conducted for
four different infection rates: 0.1 (low), 0.3 (moderate),
0.6 (high) and 0.9 (extreme) for sensitivity analysis.
The parameters μ and ν are the mean incubation peri-
ods for chickens and ducks, respectively, and were
obtained from values reported by both the World
Health Organization and utilized by the South Korean
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
during the AI outbreak [31]. The incubation period
values in the simulation were assumed to be normally
distributed random variates with mean μ and ν and with
variance proportional to the square of the experimen-
tally reported range of incubation period values. During
the incubation period no control method could be
applied to farms and the environment because the
symptoms associated with the infection cannot be easily
discerned. The lack of symptoms and/or human factors
was assumed to cause a delay time of j in reporting AI
outbreaks. All parameters other than μ and ν were com-
mon to chicken and duck species in the model.
The infection spreading distance is represented by g
s h o w ni nF i g u r e3 C .F a r m sw i t h i nt h ei n f e c t i o n
spreading distance are risk of being infected by avian
flu with an infection probability τ. The quarantine
radius, l, represents the range of the fixed radius cul-
ling area that is ordered for controlling spread of AI
s h o w ni nF i g u r e3 C .
Chickens and ducks are typically housed in poultry
farms and there is not much spatial movement of the
virus because of actual movement of the birds. However,
chickens and ducks are moved in the course of trade. In
the model, the movement of flocks of birds could be
either local or long-range. We assumed that AI infected
poultry flocks could not undergo movement. The prob-
ability of local movement was (1 - ω) and distance relo-
cated was a random variate from an exponential
distribution with rate constant ψ distance units
-1
(equivalently, the length scale is ψ
-1 distance units). The
probability of long-range movement was ω and poultry
flocks could be randomly relocated to any of the 76 unit
squares that comprise South Korea in our system.
Because we lacked information on the transportation
routes for long-range movement and wild bird move-
ment patterns in our model, we assumed that poultry
flocks were relocated randomly.
The probability of an infected bird dying was repre-
sented by θ. We simulated the equivalent of 50 days of
an AI outbreak. The average natural lifespan of chickens
and ducks are 7-15 years and 10-20 years, respectively;
however, the lifespan of in-house poultry can be as
short as 45 days. In the model, we do not consider the
natural death rate of the healthy poultry.
To obtain a parsimonious model of AI spreading, we
let poultry flocks with an active AI infection in the func-
tional radius ldie with probability τ. The spatial extent
of AI spreading can then be written as:
  tt a t ft t + =+ > Δ 0 10 (( ) ) f o r t i m e
where fa(t) is the ratio of the actual number of
infected poultry flocks to the number of all poultry
flocks in l. In modeling AI spreading we set the infec-
tion probability, τ, of the infected poultry flocks within
Table 1 The number of blocks and the number of chicken and duck farms by province. The locations of the province
are summarized in Figure 3A
Province Abbreviation on Map Occupied blocks Chicken farms Duck farms
Gyunggi GI 9 360 63
Gwangwon GW 15 105 8
Chungbuk CB 6 168 126
Chungnam CN 7 420 35
Junbook JB 6 294 144
Junnam JN 10 260 390
Gyungbuk GB 15 435 15
Gyungnam GN 9 189 27
Jaeju (island)* JJ 0 53 6
* The number of poultry farms is not included in the model since Jaeju is an island.
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is a stochastic process in fa as a function of t [32-34].
Although various other attributes and parameters could
be applied to further enrich this model, the approach
described provided a parsimonious yet effective model for
describing the key spatiotemporal features of AI spread.
In each time step, the model entails three sequential
processes, (i) onset of AI spreading (controlled by τ), (ii)
warning messages to neighboring poultry farms and (iii)
culling of poultry farms having high infection probabil-
ity. We discuss (ii) and (iii) below.
When AI infection is detected, warning messages are
distributed to all neighboring poultry flocks within a
radius g from the source. If the number of warning mes-
sages exceeds an actionable threshold, the culling pro-
cess is activated; so that all birds in poultry farms in the
range of l are culled [35].
Let qi(g) denote the number of poultry flocks i in the
region of possible infection. We assign a weight 0 ≤ wk
≤ 1 to characterize the state of fitness of a poultry flock,
where 0 and 1 define death and best health, respectively.
The infection level at any poultry flock i at the iteration
step denoted via time tk can then be written as:
ut wq ik k
k
q
k
i
() =− ≥
= ∑ 10
1
Observe that ui (0) = 0 (healthy) and a dead flock will
have ui(t ® ∞) ® 1.
It turns out that our model converges in time quickly
to the final values of affected areas and hence the
asymptotic behavior in t for our studies can be safely
extracted. We can characterize the AI spreading via:
Ut It Ct
V
ut ij
t
t
i j
() () () ( ) ≡+ ≡
′
∑ ∑
1
2 0
where, I(t) represents the number of bird flocks
affected by AI infection at time t and C(t) represents the
Figure 3 A, The schematic representation of the model used in
our simulations. The map shows the land area of South Korea
segmented into 76, 1 × 1 unit squares (1 unit = 37.5 Km). The
different color schemes represent the area of different provinces. B,
Schematic representation of how an individual farm (a group of
chickens or ducks) from the AI susceptible state (S) into incubation
status (I) for the 2-17 day period (varies for chickens and ducks). In
this status, a farm could transfer a virus without evidence of
infection. After the period of incubation, it moves into activation
status (A) where it could die by death probability of infected birds.
C, g is the infection spreading distance between poultry flocks and
l, is the radius of culling area from a center of infected poultry
flocks.
Table 2 Model parameters used for simulation
Description Parameter Value
Size of unit square - 37.5 km × 37.5 km
Infection probability τ 1.0 (0.1, 0.3, 0,6, 0.9)
Chicken incubation period μ 2.5 days (0-5 days)
Duck incubation period ν 8.5 days (0-17 days)
Quarantine radius l 0.05 - 1.5 units
Long-range relocation probability ω 0.0083 per day
Short-range relocation rate constant ψ 162 units
-1
Infection spreading distance g 0.15 unit
Death probability of infected birds θ 0.5 per day
Delay in reporting outbreaks j 1 day (1, 2, 3) days
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Page 6 of 13culled bird flocks in farms at time t.
Ut
V
ut i
i
() () →∞ ≡ →∞ ∑
1
2 0
where, V0 is the total number of poultry flocks and
the angular parenthesis denotes the average over 10
3
independent runs on the same random network.
Parameter Estimation
Parameter estimates were obtained by minimizing the
squared difference between the observed data from the
2008 South Korean epidemic and the calculated results
from our model. The model calculations were averaged
over 100 realizations. The minimization objective func-
tion F(P) was:
F y szt x szt iii iii
i
( ) ( ,,,) ( ,,) PP ≡− [] ∑
2
The P in the objective function represents the vector
containing the model parameters that are to be esti-
mated. The quantity x(si, zi, ti) represents the data point
corresponding to each observation i wherein si is
the species (either chicken or duck) corresponding to
the data point, zi is the spatial region corresponding to
the data point and ti is time over which the data point
was accrued The y(P, si, zi, ti) is the calculated value
from the model that corresponds to si, zi, ti.S i m p l e x
minimization with the Nelder-Mead algorithm was
employed to determine the parameter estimates at the
optimum [36]. Java code for the minimization algorithm
was obtained from [37].
Results
Simulations Comparing AI Spread With and Without
Containment Strategies
The outcomes from the multi-agent model were
strongly dependent on the control strategies deployed
and the spreading characteristics of the epidemic in the
context of its environment. The model exhibited charac-
teristics of spatially limited spread when effective con-
tainment strategies were deployed and widespread
spatial dispersion followed by self-limited termination
when the containment strategy proved ineffective. The
parameters used for the model simulations are summar-
ized in Table 2.
Figure 4A shows the average time course from 10
3 AI
outbreak simulation realizations of a large AI epidemic
due to an initial outbreak at Junbook province in the
absence and in the presence of the containment strat-
egy. The extent of infection in the absence of a control
strategy was significantly greater than that with a con-
trol strategy (Figure 4A). Two distinct processes cause
Figure 4 A, The time course for the average fraction of culled
and infected farms with (blue bars) and without the
containment strategy (gray bars) are shown. During the early
stage of the AI infection, 0 to 10 days, there are a lot of culled birds
in poultry farms in order to contain AI spreading. B, The average
fraction of healthy (green circles), infected (red circles) and culled
(blue circles) poultry farms at t = 50 days as a function of l are
shown. C, The adverse effects of reporting delays are shown. The
average fraction of healthy farms at t = 50 days are plotted as
function of l. The curve with green circles, blue circles, and red
circles represent j =1 ,j = 2 and j =3 .
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and death due to culling in the containment strategy.
On average, when there is no containment strategy, the
number of cases peaked 20 days after the initial out-
break. Upon occurrence of the first infection, the con-
tainment process initiated culling of about 1% of a flock
of birds in poultry farms. The culling process prevents
infection from spreading further to flocks of birds in
neighboring poultry farms. The fraction of poultry flocks
culled peaks on day 3; however, this culling reduces the
loss of poultry at later times. Maximal damage occurred
earlier in the presence of the control strategy primarily
due to the culling process, whereas the damage in the
uncontrolled epidemic scenario was entirely due to
death by AI.
Efficient Containment Strategies
Figure 4B shows that there is an optimum value for the
quarantine radius l. Strategies involving a larger than
optimum radius of culling or quarantine area cause
unnecessarily culled flocks in poultry farms and strate-
gies with a smaller than optimum radius of culling quar-
antine area cause loss of poultry due to dispersal of the
AI infection.
Figures 4B shows the dependence of the average frac-
tions of healthy poultry farms, poultry farms lost due to
AI infection and culled farms as a function of l.A slin-
creases, the fraction of healthy poultry farms increases
until l = 0.5. However, for l > 0.5, the fraction of
healthy farms decreases, which is caused by unnecessary
culling. For l < 0.1, the fraction of culled farms
increases as lincreases. But for l > 0.1, the fraction of
culled farms decreases because culling prevents the
infection from spreading to nearest available susceptible
poultry. Therefore, the fraction of the healthy poultry
farms keeps increasing until unnecessary culled farms
are reported at the value of 0.5.
Effect of Reporting Delays
The extent of infection is strongly dependent on the
reporting delays (Figure 4C). Rapid reporting and action
is, as expected, a critical factor. Figure 4C shows the
dependence of the average fraction of healthy poultry
flocks on l for reporting delay j values of 1, 2, and 3
days. When outbreaks are reported within a day after AI
symptoms appeared in the poultry flocks, the
containment strategy works well (Figure 4C). However,
a two-day delay in reporting the infection causes the
containment strategy to be much less effective and three
days of reporting delay substantially reduce the effective-
ness of the containment strategy. These results show
that early reporting dramatically affects the effectiveness
of the containment strategy - early reporting is as
important as deploying the optimal value of l.
Effect of AI Incubation Period
Additionally, we conducted sensitivity analysis to exam-
ine the effect of AI incubation period because this para-
meter affects the ability to detect the presence of
infected birds. Figures 5B and 5D were obtained with μ
and ν = 0 whereas Figures 5A and C were obtained with
the incubation periods of μ = 2.5 days for chickens and
ν = 8.5 days for ducks as shown in the Table 2. A repre-
sentative range of l values and infection probabilities
were examined. All the data were obtained at 50 days
from the initial infection. The results demonstrate that
containment is more effective in Figures 5B and D
because the disease symptoms become manifest immedi-
ately upon infection and containment strategies can be
implemented promptly.
The results in Figures 5A and 5C demonstrate that a
nuanced approach to containment is necessary for AI
that spreads with high infection probability (τ = 0.6 and
τ = 0.9) and has a longer incubation period (μ =2 . 5
days for chickens and ν = 8.5 days for ducks). Small l
values result in greater overall loss of poultry; in com-
parison, the results in absen c eo fa nA Ii n c u b a t i o np e r -
iod are relatively insensitive to l values over the entire
range of infection probability values investigated.
Modeling the Data from the 2008 South Korean Epidemic
We used least square regression to fit our model to the
data and to estimate the model parameters correspond-
ing to infection probability (τ), quarantine radius (l),
long-range relocation probability (ω), short-range reloca-
tion length scale (ψ), and incubation period for ducks (ν)
for describing the data.
The parameters estimated from the regression ana-
lyses are summarized in Table 3. The time course and
spatial distribution predicted by the model are shown in
Figure 6. Comparing to Figure 2, the model predicted
an average of 39 outbreaks, which compares favorably
with the 42 outbreaks that were reported by the South
Korean authorities. The predicted time course had a
maximum value at the first and second 4-day intervals.
The model also predicted an increased number of out-
breaks in Junbook compared to other provinces as
observed in the 2008 South Korean AI epidemic.
Although the simulated results from the modeling
exhibited quantitative features similar to the data from
the 2008 South Korean AI epidemic, the simulations
tended to underestimate the occurrence of outbreaks in
ducks and the simulated time course had less abrupt
variations than those observed.
Based on the modeling, we estimated the value of l
for the 2008 South Korean AI epidemic would be l =
0.293 which is equivalent to an 11 Km of quarantine
Kim et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2010, 10:236
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Page 8 of 13Figure 5 The sensitivity of the different containment parameters are shown if containment efforts began 50 days after the first case.
Results of simulations are shown for different values of infection probabilities and incubation periods. Representative values of l are 0.16 (dark
green), 0.32 (green), 0.64 (light green) and 1.28 (yellow green) in Figures A and B, and 0.16 (dark blue), 0.32 (blue), 0.64 (light blue) and 1.28
(grayed blue) in Figures C and D. A, The fractional number of healthy birds in poultry farms as the function of τ is shown with normal chicken
and duck incubation periods. B, The fractional number of healthy birds in poultry farms as the function of τ is shown without the incubation
periods. C, The fractional number of culled birds in poultry farms as the function of τ is shown with normal chicken and duck incubation
periods. D, The fractional number of culled birds in poultry farms as the function of τ is shown without the incubation periods.
Table 3 Model parameters estimated from the 2008 South Korean epidemic
Description Parameter Fixed or Estimated Value
Size of unit square - Fixed 37.5 km × 37.5 km
Infection probability τ Estimated 0.429 day
-1
Chicken incubation period μ Fixed 2.5 days
Duck incubation period ν Estimated 7.2 days
Quarantine radius l Estimated 0.293 units
Long range relocation probability ω Estimated 0.0083 day
-1
Short-range relocation rate constant ψ Estimated 162 units
-1
Infection spreading distance g Fixed 0.15 unit
Death probability of infected birds θ Fixed 0.5 day
-1
Delay in reporting outbreaks j Fixed 1 days
Kim et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2010, 10:236
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Page 9 of 13radius. The l value from our modeling corresponding to
estimated parameters from the 2008 South Korean AI
epidemic was l = 0.465. From the modeling, we could
analyze the efficacy of the South Korean authorities’
strategies on AI outbreaks in 2008. We calculated the
protection rate of poultry farms at time t, R(t),o nA I
outbreak via:
Rt
It Ct
V
()
() ()
=−
+
×
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ 100
0
100
where, I(t) represents the number of poultry flocks
affected by AI infection at time t, C(t)r e p r e s e n t st h e
culled poultry flocks at time t and V0 is the total num-
ber of poultry flocks at time 0. Our model estimated
parameter values predict the protection of 96.5% of
poultry at time t = 50 days. The South Korean authori-
ties reported the protection of 94.3% of poultry. This
result suggests the South Korean containment strategy
was very effective given the epidemic conditions at con-
trolling the 2008 AI outbreak.
Figure 6 Results from fitting our model to data based on the 2008 South Korea AI epidemic.A ,T h et i m ec o u r s eo fA Io u t b r e a k si n
chickens (yellow bars) and ducks (green bars) after an initial outbreak in Junbook province are shown. The line represents the cumulative
number of AI outbreaks in poultry. B, The spatial distribution by province of AI outbreaks in chickens (yellow bars) and ducks (green bars)
predicted by our model are shown. Green and yellow bars represent the averaged number of AI outbreaks of a flock of chickens and ducks in
poultry farms. The data in both Figures are averaged over 100 simulations of the model.
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Page 10 of 13The heat maps in Figure 7 compare the observed pat-
terns of outbreaks during the 2008 South Korean AI
epidemic to simulation results for the spatiotemporal
dispersal of the AI epidemic for different containment
scenarios. In the absence of containment, the model
predicts that AI would spread to almost the entire coun-
try. Because of the initial outbreak occurred in Junbook
(JB) province, the southwestern part would be most
strongly affected. The northeastern part is less affected
because of the lower density of poultry farms. The heat
maps also highlight the potential improvements possible
with the implementation of a containment strategy with
an estimated value of l = 0.465.
Conclusions
We modeled a spatially explicit simulation of how AI
spread in South Korea in 2008. The model explicitly
incorporates interactions among flocks of chicken and
duck poultry, as these are known to be the primary con-
texts of influenza transmission. Our study confirms that
Figure 7 Spatiotemporal dynamics of the AI outbreaks in South Korea in 2008 are shown at 4, 12, 20, 28, 36 and 42 days after the
first outbreak. Colors represents the infection intensity from low (yellow) to high (purple) for AI spreading including culling and infected
poultry farms. A, Actual data for the 2008 AI epidemic from the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, South Korea are shown. B,
Simulation in the absence of a containment strategy is shown. C, Simulation from our model for parameter values of l = 0.293 and τ = 0.429,
which were selected to mimic the South Korea containment strategy is shown. D, Simulation with an estimated l value of l = 0.465 and τ =
0.429 is shown. The columns correspond to the times indicated. All simulation results are averaged over 100 simulations of the model.
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Page 11 of 13the analysis of spatiotemporal epidemic patterns has
considerable power to helpi l l u m i n a t ee p i d e m i c
dynamics [20].
Our studies suggest that the containment plans with
well chosen parameters are critical for minimizing loss
of poultry flocks. The containment plans with aggressive
quarantine areas l > 0.5, are unlikely to be effective
because they can result in a higher fraction of unneces-
sarily culled poultry flocks. The containment plans with
smaller quarantine areas, l < 0.5, are also unlikely to be
effective, because they can result in a higher fractions of
infected poultry flocks. In addition, reliable information
about the important factors identified here along with
an efficient and effective quarantine plan is needed to
achieve high levels of containment. Although the effec-
tiveness of most containment strategies can be good,
any delays with regard to understanding the local-
environment specific data could allow the pandemic to
spread [3].
We also estimated parameters obtained by minimizing
the squared difference between the observed data from
the 2008 South Korean epidemic and the calculated
results from our model. Data availability led us to model
South Korea rather than any perceived greater risk of
emergence compared to other countries in the region;
however, we believe our conclusions may be potentially
relevant to controlling the spread of AI in other parts in
the world. If a newly emergent influenza strain appears,
the model could be calibrated to the available data and
used to determine reasonable intervention options at
the epidemic source.
Currently the World Health Organization (WHO)
tracks the number of avian-to-human and possible
human-to-human transmission events reported [38].
The widespread distribution of the avian influenza virus
H5N1 has increased the risk for the occurrence of an
influenza pandemic in the near future [39]. The detec-
tion of even a single case of human-to-human transmis-
sion of the avian influenza virus could necessitate
heightened pandemic alerts that have high economic
cost to countries that are affected [40]. The overarching
fear in public health circles is the possible occurrence of
af l us t r a i nw i t hv i r u l e n c ec o m p a r a b l et ot h eH 1 N 1
virus of 1918, which killed nearly 40 million people [41].
Avian flu viruses are now common in domesticated
poultry but despite the industrial scale of modern poul-
try farming, they have not gained traction in the human
population [42,43]. Flu viruses however can undergo
reassortment - indeed the ongoing 2009 H1N1 “swine
flu” epidemic in the United States is a virus strain that
has undergone reassortment. The possibility that a
deadly form the H5N1 avian flu could mix with the
highly transmissible H1N1 virus to make a virus with
the worst properties of both cannot be precluded [44].
Our modeling approach provides a basis for using infor-
mation from prior epidemics to develop containment
strategies and evaluate what-if scenarios for evaluating
their potential efficacy at different conditions.
To apply this model in other countries or different
subtypes of a strain, the parameters we provided can be
modified to meet different conditions and environments.
However, this model did not sufficiently incorporate
complicated environmental factors, such as effects of
transportation routes, wild bird movement pathway,
local weather and geographical characteristics. In addi-
tion, the stagnant population of poultry and the lack of
attributes for different types of poultry farms could
make the model limited when used for generalized AI
spread simulation.
A few of the model parameters we have incorporated,
such as infection probability, incubation periods, reloca-
tion probability and relocation ranges, could not be reli-
ably ascertained from the fitting. For example, the range
of latency period we have used, μ = 2.5 days and ν = 8.5
days, would not be long enough to simulate for low
pathogenic AI (LPAI) since the latent period of LPAI
could reach over 2 weeks. To reduce these uncertainties,
prompt and accurate information obtained from high-
quality epidemiological data by public health agencies
around the world is critical to estimate the infection
from virus spreads. Such improvement in our under-
standing of how a virus behaves will extend our options
both to control avian influenza and our ability to predict
virus spread by epidemics. Regardless of uncertainties,
preparedness with this type of simulation would be
extremely valuable in effective planning and modeling of
oncoming disease outbreaks. A feasible strategy for con-
tainment of the spreading of AI offers the potential to
reduce loss of poultry, minimize economic impact on
the poultry industry, and prevent possible threats on the
human population.
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